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This note provides a simple 
in which involuntary unemployment may 
monopolistic behaviour on the product
example of an economy 
























































































































































































In a recent paper [ 1], d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira 
and Gerard-Varet (ADG f o r  short) have investigated the 
possibility of involuntary unemployment in the framework 
of a simple three commodity economy in which the production 
sector is an oligopoly a la Cournot. The firms take the 
wage rate as given and involuntary unemployment is defined 
as a situation where unemployment prevails whatever is the 
wage rate. It is therefore a situation where there is no 
way in which full employment could be achieved by acting 
on the wage rate. It is also a situation where the wage 
rate would be zero if it was determined competitively on 
the labour market.
The particularity of their model lies in the 
assumption that the firms know the objective demand curve 
and therefore take account of the effect of their employment 
decisions on the demand. This is at variance with a related 
paper by Hart f 41 where the agents are assumed to be negli­
gible relative to the size of the economy and therefore 
cannot affect aggregate income. The phenomenon of involuntary 
unemployment has also been studied by Grandmont and Laroque 
[3] in a model featuring imperfect competition, its occurence 
being due to pessimistic sale expectations held by the firms 
whose production process tdikes time. In ADG' s model on the 
contrary production is instantaneous and it is the inter­
temporal behaviour of the consumers which generates involuntary 
unemployment.
The purpose of the present note is to provide an 
example illustrating ADG's results for the case of a monopoly. 
The example is restricted to a monopolistic situation because 
the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium requires strong 





























































































The example indicates that involuntary unemployment 
typically occurs when the initial wealth of the consumer is 
small relatively to the existing labour supply. It also leads 
to a stronger proposition: Unlike ADG's result, the possibility 
of involuntary unemployment can be shown to exist whatever is 
the labour supply and its occurrence does not require that the 
"Ford effect" on employment of a wage increase is always 
dominated. Furthermore, while in ADG the current profits are 
distributed at the end of the period and do not influence 
consumption decisions, here current profits are taken into 
account by assuming that consumers are either "rentiers" or 
workers, like for instance in the model of Glustoff [2].
The continuation of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the model and to 
the statement of the assumptions. The definition of a monopolistic 
equilibrium is given in Section 3. In Section 4, involuntary 
unemployment is formally defined and the conditions of its 
occurrence are given. Finally, concluding remarks are offered 





























































































We consider a simple three commodity economy. 
There is an aggregate consumption good which is produced 
out of labour. Money is used as a medium of exchanoe and 
is the unique store of value. The price level and the wage 
rate are expressed in terms of money and denoted by p and 
w respectively. The economy is considered at a given period 
of time. Its past is given and enters into the agents' 
expectations about its future. At the beginning of the 
period, there is a given stock of money whose distribution 
among the agents results from past decisions.
The production sector of the economy consits 
of a single large firm whose technology is described by 
the constant returns to scale production function y = z.
In the consumption sector, the agents differ 
in the way in which their income is generated. There is 
a set A of workers selling their labour to the production 
sector and a set B of stockholders having shares in the 
profits. We assume that these two sets are disjoint and 
that, within each set, the agents have identical inter­
temporal preferences. All the agents have an horizon limi­
ted to the next period and the workers supply labour in- 
elastically. The preferences are therefore defined over 
current and future consumption and we assume that they are 
strictly convex and homothetic. Furthermore, we assume 
that the agents take their current decisions as if they 
would receive no further income in the future.
0Let p denote the price level expected to prevail 
in the next period. Then, if denotes the current budget 




























































































goods can be written as
c ,i H, (
p*‘ Rp 
P IT
with k = a for a worker and k = b for a stockholder. 
Clearly, 0 < H^(6) < 1  for all 0 >  0, k = a,b.
The functions H and H. are assumed to be a b
continuous and non-decreasing over a213R+ , and to satisfy 
the following conditions:
U) H is Stviavl'J a Increasing on IR , ;T
{-Li) 0 <  H (0; < 1  a and F, (0) < 1 for ail 0 > 0;
a n ) H ( 0 ) > H. (0) a b for all 0 > 0;
(iv) Ha (0) " Hb (0) = 0.
Hence, current demand for consumption goods does not decrease
when the future price increases and, for a worker, it must 
increase. Whatever the ratio between future and current 
prices, a worker always wants to consume in each period; 
for a stockholder, this requirement applies only to future 
consumption. The marginal propensity to spend of a stock­
holder never exceeds the one of a worker, a usual condition. 
Finally, the margina propersitJ.es to spend go to zero when 
the ratio between future are or rent prices goes to 
zero. I n t e r t e m p o r a l  preferences yielding demand func­
tions satisfying these assumptions are represented by the 




























































































For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all 
agents have the same expectations about the future price 
level. It is given by p = ip (p) where ip is a continuous 
function on 3R+ satisfying the following two conditions:
(i) ip (p)/p has a maximum on 3R+ and all maxima are
strictly positive;
(it) lim f M = 0 .p voo p
While excluding unit elastic price expectations, these 
conditions allow for a wide class of expectations functions.
We denote by m, > 0 the initial money balances 
of agent i; by 0 the labour supply of worker i ; and
by a., 0 < ou < 1 , the share in profits of shareholder i. 
The total stock of money is then given by M = ^ie-AUBmi ' 
aggregate labour supply is given by L = 2 £ . ; and by defini-
tion 2. a. = 1. We assume that M > 0 and L > 0. The1 (EJd 1
initial distribution of the stock of money between workers 
and stockholders is defined by
2 m .ISA l = yM
and we assume that 0 < y < 1 .
The budget of agent i is given by R = rrr+r if 
i is a worker, with 0 < r < w£^ depending on his or her 
current employment situation; it is given by R = iTK+a^n if 
i is a stockholder and II are the profits.
Independently of the way in which employment is 
distributed among the workers, the aggregate demand for 




























































































0 < z < L, a price level p > 0 and a wage rate w >  0 
is given by:
pc = Ga (p) ( yM+wz)+Gb (p) ( (1 -y ) M+ (p-w) z) (1)
where Gk (p) = Hk (ij> (p)/p) , k = a,b.
3. Monopolistic Equilibrium
Replacing c by z in the equation (1) and solving 
for z, we get
y Ga (p) +  ( 1 - lJ) Gb ( P )
C(P,W'M) = P( 1 -Gb (p)) +w( Gb (p) -Ga (p)) M {2)
The assumptions on H& and Hb ensure that this expression is 
well defined for p > w.
Given some (w,M,L), the objective of the firm is to 
maximize II(p,w,M) = (p-w) Max (0 , £ (p,w,M) ) subject to p > 0 
and £ (p,w,M) < L. A monopolistic equilibrium is then defined 
as a solution of this problem. Here we will restrict our 
attention to solutions at which the labour supply constraint 
is not binding, i.e. to monopolistic equilibria at which 
there is no excess demand for labour.
Clearly, the set of prices which maximizes II (p,w,M) 
subject to p > 0 is independent of M and L. We denote it by 
P(w) and we will show that for every w > 0, P(w) ^ 0 and pep(w) 
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Let us consider first the case where w >  0. Then 
(p,w,M) < 0 whenever p < w; II (w,w,M) = 0; and If (p,w,M) > 0 
whenever p > w. Furthermore, it is easily verified that
lira IT (p,w,M) = 0D-̂ ooJL
Indeed, pe,/p+0 as p-*-00 and therefore G^CpJ-^O as p+«> for 
k = a,b. Hence, for any w > 0 ,  TI(w,p,M) has at least one 
maximum and all maxima satisfy p > w.
When w = 0, the objective of the firm becomes 
a strictly increasing function of ijj(p)/p. Therefore p 
maximizes II(p,0,M) if and only if it maximizes ip (p) /p. 
Hence given the assumptions made on ip r U(p,0,M) has at 
least one maximum and all maxima are positive.
4. Involuntary Unemployment
The question is the following. Given some aggregate 
labour supply L > 0, do there exist values of the stock of 
money M > 0, such that for any w, w > 0, the monopolistic 
equilibria all involve unemployment ? Formally, given L > 0, 
do there exist values of M, M > 0, such that for any w > 0, 
pep(w) implies £(p,w,M) < L ?
The answer is yes: For every L > 0, there actually 
exists b(L) > 0 such that 0 < M < b(L) implies Z, (p,w,M) < L 
for all pep (w) and all w > 0. Indeed pep (w) implies p > w, 
and G (p) > G, (p) ; hence, using (2), we get:
c l JD
C (p,W,M) < uGa (P) + ) Gb (P)p( 1“Ga (p) )
Let w go to infinity; then p-*°° as well and t̂ (p)/p-»-0.





























































































We can therefore conclude that, for any M > 0, 
the supremum of the labour demand over all (p,w) such that 
pep (w) and w 0 exists and is of the form yM, y > 0. We 
then simply take b(L) = L/Y.
It is interesting to notice that the above result 
holds when H^(0) is identically zero and y = 1 which is the 
situation considered by ADG. The result also holds when 
(0) = ^(0) identically, a situation where some of the 
workers could be stockholders as well.
A natural question is to ask whether the 
assumptions made are compatible with the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium with a positive wage rate. At a competitive 
equilibrium p = w and p is the solution of the equation 
C(p,p,M) = L, i.e.
yGa (p) + d-y)Gb (p) L
p( 1-G (p) ) M
a.
We denote by cp(p) the left-hand side of this equation.
If p-*«>, then pe/p-*0 and Ĝ . (p) -*-0 for k = a,b. Hence, we have
lim cp(p) = 0.
p -*-co
On the other hand if the expectation function ip is such that
ip (p) /p is bounded away from zero s then we also have
lim ip(p) = 00. p+o
Hence, this further assumption ensures that, for all M > 0 
and L > 0, a competitive equilibrium exists and any competi­





























































































We have given an example of a class of economies in 
which whatever is the wage rate, possibly zero, the resulting 
monopolistic equilibria all involves unemployment.
The example is not trivial in the sense that, at 
an equilibrium, there is always a positive level of employment. 
The result requires neither satiation nor maximum capacity in 
production. The demand for labour must not necessarily decrease 
when the wage rate increases, i.e. the "Ford Effect" of a wage 
increase needs not be always dominated; it should only be 
dominated for large enough wage rates. The conditions under 
which the result holds are compatible with the existence of 
competitive equilibrium with a positive wage rate. Finally, 
involuntary unemployment is obtained either by considering 
low enough initial money balances at fixed labour supply, or 
alternatively by considering a high enough labour supply at 
fixed money stock; the result is not obtained by playing 






























































































[ 1] C. d'ASPREMONT, R. DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and L.A. GERARD-VARET, 
Oligopoly and involuntary unemployment, Discussion Paper 8404, 
CORE, Université de Louvain, 1984.
[2] E. GLUSTOFF, On the existence of a Keynesian equilibrium,
Review of Economic Studies 35 (1968), 327-334.
[3] J.-M. GRANDMONT and G. LAROQUE, On Keynesian temporary 
equilibria, Review of Economic Studies 43 (1976), 53-67.
[4] 0. HART, A model of imperfect competition with Keynesian 



























































































WORKING PAPERS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
No. 1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
No. 3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
No. 9: Manfred E. STREJ.T Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy 
of an Abstraction.
No. 10: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics
No. 11: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income 
Distribution and Unemployment
No. 12: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI 
Guglielmo CHIODI
On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
No. 22: Don PAT INKIN Paul A. Samuelson on Monetary Theory
No. 23: Marcello DE CECCO inflation ana Structural Change in 
the Euro-Dollar Market
No. 24: Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate 
in the '20s and the ’70s
No. 23: Manfred E. STREjlT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
No. 34: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory; an 
Overview
No. 35: Richard M. GOODWIN
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regu­
lation
No. 46: Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis 
for Strike Patterns in Europe?
No. 47: Richard M. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
No. 48: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Reduction 
de la Durée du Travail
No. 56: Bere RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Preferences in Policy Optimization 
and Optimal Economie Policy
No. 60: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time




























































































No. 65: Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intra-industry Trade in Two areas: 
Some Aspects of Trade Within and 
Outside a Custom Union
No. 66: Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control: 
The Deutschmark Case
No. 67: Gerd WEINRICH On the Theory of Effective Demand 
under Stochastic Rationing
No. 68: Saul ESTRIN 
Derek C. JONES
The Effects of Worker Participation 
upon Productivity in French Pro­
ducer Cooperatives
No. 69: Bere RUSTEM 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences: A Contribution to 
the Frischian Scheme
No. 72: Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
No. 75: Sheila A. CHAPMAN Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970- 
1983. An Overview.
No. 90: Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and In­
dustrialization in Yugoslavia, 
1958-1982
No. 91: Wolfgang GEBAUER Kondratieff's Long Waves
No. 92: Elisabeth DE GELLINCK 
Paul A. GEROSKI 
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 
Variations in the Effect of Trade 
on Industry Performance
84/103: Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in 
the Interwar Period
84/105: Derek C. JONES The Economic Performance of Pro­
ducer Cooperatives within Command 
Economies: Evidence for the Case 
of Poland
84/111: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations 
in Output in a Mixed Economy
84/113: Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114: Saul ESTRIN 
Jan SVEJNAR
Explanations of Earnings in Yugoslavia: 
the Capital and Labor Schools Compared
84/116: Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference



























































































84/118: Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and Involuntary
Unemployment
-  3 -
Spare copies of these Working Papers can be obtained from:
Secretariat Economics Department 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana






















































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European 
University Institute, Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge —  depending on the availability 
of stocks —  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy



























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 11/84
To :The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana


































































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
EUI WORKING PAPERS
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranationalism Revisited - 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Leonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future Prospects
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der 
national-sozialistischen Architektur
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction
10:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics




On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
13:Gunther TEUBNER Reflexive Rationalitaet des Rechts
14:Gunther TEUBNER Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern" Law
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
16:Ian BUDGE Democratic Party Government: Formation
anu functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries
17:Hans DAALDER Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
Initial Mapping
18:Giuseppe DI PALMA Party Government and Democratic 
Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies
19 :Richard S. KATZ Party Government: A Rationalistic 
Conception
20:Juerg STEINER Decision Process and Policy Outcome: 
An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level
21:Jens ALBER The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Empirical Evidence
22:Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory
23.-MarceIlo DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in the 
Euro-Dollar Market
24:Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in 
the '20s and the '70s
25:Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
26.-Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - 
Prospects and Repercussions
27:Terence C. DAINTITH Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
28:Frank C. CASTLES/ 
Peter MAIR
Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
Expert Judgements
29:Karl HOHMANN The Ability of German Political 
Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: 
the Situation in 1982
30:Max KAASE The Concept of Political Culture: Its 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
31:Klaus TOEPFER Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Regional Economic Development Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany
32:Ronald INGLEHART The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages Among West European Elites 
and Publics
33:Moshe LISSAK Boundaries and Institutional Linkages 
Between Elites: Some Illustrations 
from Civil-Military Elites in Israel
34:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview
35:Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regulation
36:Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance 
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979
37:G. LOWELL FIELD/ 
John HIGLEY
The States of National Elites and the 
Stability of Political Institutions in 
81 Nations, 1950-1982
38:Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political 
System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of 
Consensus?
39:Edward 0. LAUMANN/ 
David KNOKE
A Framework for Concatenated Event 
Analysis
40:Gwen MOOR/
Richard D . ALBA
Class and Prestige Origins in the 
American Elite
41:Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies 
in the Irish republic, 1948-1981: The 
Evidence of Manifestos
42:Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine 
State. The Art of the Impossible and 
the Possible
43:Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural 




Zur Implementation von 
Gerichtsurteilen. Hypothesen zu den 





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
45-.Alexis PAULY/ 
René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties
46:Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis for 
Strike Patterns in Europe?
47:Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48:J .P . FITOUSSI/ 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de 
la Durée du Travail
49:Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit 
Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit 
International
50:Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei 
Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e 
Divieti di Discriminazione nella 
Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in Materia 
di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e 
Professionale dei Lavoratori
51:Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsability as a Problem 
of Company Constitution
52:Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic 
Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
53:Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of 
Italian Legislators. A Contribution of 
the Understanding of a Polarized 
System
54:Mattei DOGAN How to become a Cabinet Minister in 
Italy: Unwritten Rules of the 
Political Game
55:Maricino BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
Narciso PIZARRO




Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economic Policy
57:Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the 
Prospect for Party Government
55:Christopher Hill/ 
James MAYALL





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
60:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
61:Philippe LEFORT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la 
Famille dans le Ménager de Paris et le 
Second Libro di Famiglia, de L.B. 
Alberti
62:Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren
63 : Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI Law and Social Conflict
64:Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s
65:Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some 
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a 
Custom Union
66:Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control : The 
Deutschemark Case




The Effects of Worker Participation 




On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences : A Contribution to the 
Frischian Scheme
70:Werner MAIHOFER Politique et Morale
71:Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: 
Comparison with Southern France
72:Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
73:Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the Modern State
74:Philippe SCHMITTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist 
Practice





























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
76:Richard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the 
Netherlands and its International 
Consequences, May 1945 - March 1951
77:Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British 
Policy towards European Integration
78:Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in 
1947?
79:Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: How a 
Transistory Experiment answered to 
Deep-Rooted Needs
80:Werner ABELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
81:Helge PHARO The Domestic and International 
Implications of Norwegian 
Reconstruction
82:Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951
83:Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 
1947-1952
84:Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economie Policy in the 
Italian Reconstruction
85:William DIEBOLD, Jr. Trade and Payments in Western Europe 
in Historical Perspective: A Personal 
View by an Interested Party
86:Franees LYNCH French Reconstruction in a European 
Context
87:Gunther TEUBNER Verrechtlichung. Begriffe, Merkmale, 
Grenzen, Auswege
88:Maria SPINEDI Les Crimes Internationaux de l'Etat 
dans les Travaux de Codification de la 
Responsabilité des Etats Entrepris par 
les Nations Unies
89 : Jelle VISSER Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar 
Western Europe
90:Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and 
Industrialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1977




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
92:Elisabeth DE GHELLINCK/ 
Paul A. GEROSKI/
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 









Community, Market, State- and 
Associations. The Prospective 
Contribution of Interest Governance 
to Social Order
95:Nigel GRIFFIN "Virtue Versus Letters": The Society 
of Jesus 1550-1580 and the Export of 
an Idea
96:Andreas KUNZ Arbeitsbeziehungen und r 
Arbeitskonflikte im oeffentlichen 
Sektor. Deutschland und 
Grossbritannien im Vergleich 1914-1924
97:Wolfgang STREECK Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations 
and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany
98:Simon A. HORNER The Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands - A Study of their Status 
under Constitutional, International 
and European Law
99:Daniel ROCHE Le Monde des Ombres
84/100:Gunther TEUBNER After Legal Instrumentalism?
84/101:Patrick NERHOT Contribution aux Débats sur le Droit 
Subjectif et le Droit Objectif comme 
Sources du Droit
84/102:Jelle VISSER The Position of Central Confederations 
in the National Union Movements
84/103:Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in the 
Inter-War Period
84/104:M. Rainer LEPSIUS Sociology in Germany and Austria 1918- 
1945. The Emigration of the Social 
Sciences and its Consequences. The 
Development of Sociology in Germany 



























































































-  8 -
PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
84/105:Derek JONES The Economic Performances of Producer 
Cooperations within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/106rPnilippe C. SCHMITTER Neo-Corporatism and the State
84/107:Marcos BUSER Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsverbaende 
auf Gesetzgebungsprozesse und das 
Vollzugswesen im Bereich des 
Umweltschutzes
84/108:Frans van WAAPDÏÏN Bureaucracy around the State:Varieties 
of Collective Self-Regulation in the 
Dutch Dairy Industry
84/109:Ruggero RANIERI The Italian Iron and Steel Industry 
and European Integration




A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations in 
Output in a Mixed Economy
84/112:Anna Elisabetta GALEOTTI Individualism and Political Theory
84/113:Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114:Saul ESTRIN/Jan SVEJNAR Explanations of Earnings in 
Yugoslavia: The Capital and Labor 
Schools Compared
84/115:Alan CAWSON/John BALLARD A Bibliography of Corporatism
84/116:Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed 
Preference Without Demand Continuity 
Assumptions
84/117:Richard T.GRIFFITHS/Frances The FRITALUX/FINEBEL Negotiations
M.B. LYNCH 1949/1950
84/118:Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and 
Involuntary Unemployment
84/119:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects; General 
Principles and E.C. Procedures




























































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE November 1984
84/121:Marcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122:Marcello DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development:
American Banking Dynamics and World 
Financial Crises
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
